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INTRODUCTION
Animal cruelty is considered a crime in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.1 Al-
though the punishment for abusing animals differs widely
among jurisdictions, all but five states make it a felony offense.2
Some states, like New York, only make it a felony if the acts of
cruelty are performed on a companion animal.3 Others, like
Pennsylvania, aggravate punishment if harm is caused to a dog,
cat or zoo animal.4 The criminalization of cruelty to animals is
by no means an American phenomenon. Comprehensive anti-
cruelty legislation has been adopted in many countries, includ-
ing the United Kingdom, Holland, Australia and Argentina, to
name a few.5
Even though most countries seem to believe that it is desir-
able to criminalize cruelty to animals, the reasons that justify
prohibiting such conduct are unclear. Whereas some jurisdic-
I See The Humane Society of the United States, State Animal Anti-Cruelty Law
Provisions, June 2008, http://www.hsus.orglweb-filesfPDF/state_cruelty-chart.pdf.
2 Id. Animal cruelty is a misdemeanor in Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, North Da-
kota and South Dakota. Id. It should be noted that Mississippi has a special statute
making it a felony to engage in cruelty to livestock. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-41-15 (2006).
Companion animals and wildlife fall outside the purview of the law. Id.
See infra note 81-82 and accompanying text (describing companion animals).
3 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a(1) (McKinney 2004).
4 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
5 For information on animal protection laws in these countries, see Law No. 14346,
Sept. 27, 1954 (Arg.); Queensland Government,
http://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/cps/rde/dpi/hs.xsl/27_10422 ENAHTML.htm (last visited Oct.
31, 2008) (providing links to various Austrlian state's or territory's animal welfare legis-
lation); Consulate General of New York,
http://www.cgny.org/article.asp?articleref=AROOOOO200EN (last visited Oct. 31, 2008)
(describing the Netherland's 1992 Animal Health and Welfare Act); Animal Welfare Act,
2006, c. 45 (Eng.) (enacting animal welfare legislation in the United Kingdom).
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tions seem partially motivated to enact the statutes because
people who harm animals are more likely to inflict suffering on
human beings, others seem to have been moved into action by a
deeply felt conviction that inflicting harm on a sentient being is
morally wrong. Moreover, some state laws are drafted in a
manner that suggests that one of the preeminent reasons for
adopting such legislation was the protection of property.
Ascertaining the reasons that justify punishing people for
engaging in acts of cruelty against animals is not merely of theo-
retical concern. As the recently decided case of People v. Garcia'
demonstrates, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the
proper scope of anti-cruelty statutes without first answering the
question of why it is that such conduct is a crime in the first
place. In Garcia, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York had to determine whether the defendant's act of
stomping on a pet goldfish, in the presence of Juan, the nine
year old custodian of the fish, constituted a felony.7 In order to
do so, the court needed to decide whether instantaneously kill-
ing a fish by stepping on him constituted an act of "aggravated
cruelty."'
Since the fish died instantly, the defendant contended that
he did not suffer extreme pain and that his death was caused
without special depravity or sadism. Thus, he asserted that the
killing was not carried out with a heightened level of cruelty.1 °
The court rejected the defendant's contention by pointing out
that, in view of the legislative history of the statute, whether an
act demonstrates aggravated cruelty depends on "the state of
mind of the perpetrator."1 1 The court's holding also seemed to be
heavily influenced by the fact that the killing of a household pet
in front of a child constitutes a "sadistic and depraved act" be-
6 812 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div. 2006).
7 Id. at 69-71.
8 Id.





cause it is intended to "inflict[] emotional pain on... the boy. 1
2
By concluding that a finding of aggravated cruelty depends
on whether the actor intended to make the owner of the animal
suffer,13 the court suggests the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes
is to deter people from engaging in acts that cause emotional
harm to human beings and not protecting animals from unjusti-
fiable inflictions of pain. Thus, according to Garcia, the real vic-
tims in these cases are not the animals who are being mis-
treated, but the humans who suffer when living creatures are
harmed.
This article will show the court's reasoning in Garcia can-
not withstand careful scrutiny. Concluding that anti-cruelty
statutes were enacted for reasons other than protecting animals
from the unwarranted infliction of pain is in tension with basic
criminal law principles. Furthermore, the best way to account
for the most salient features of anti-cruelty statutes is by ac-
knowledging that the victims to be protected by the enactment
of such laws are animals, not human beings.
Part I will provide a brief recount of the history of Anglo-
American statutes prohibiting harm to animals. This historical
analysis will show that many of these statutes were originally
enacted as a way to protect private property. However, it will
also reveal that there has been a marked trend, especially in re-
cent times, to punish animal cruelty regardless, and sometimes
despite, the property interests involved.
In Part II, the notions of victimhood, consent and harm will
be explored in order to lay the groundwork for the claims that
will be put forth in the remainder of the article. It is difficult to
have a meaningful discussion about the interest the law seeks to
protect by criminalizing cruelty to animals without first under-
standing the intricate interrelationship that exists between
these concepts. In light of the issues raised by animal cruelty
statutes, particular attention will be paid to discussing John
12 People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (Trial court description of
defendant's act.).
13 People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71 (App. Div. 2006).
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Stuart Mill's and H. L. A. Hart's conception of the "harm princi-
ple." The legitimacy of enacting victimless crimes and the ways
in which consent can negate both harm and victimhood will also
be considered.
Part III will examine five different theories advanced to ex-
plain the interest society seeks to promote by punishing acts
that are harmful to animals, namely: (1) protection of property,
(2) protection against the infliction of emotional harm to those
who have ties to the injured animal, (3) prevention of future
harm to humans, (4) enforcement of a moral principle, and (5)
protection of the animals themselves.
Part IV will explain why it is not necessarily the case, as
some animal law scholars have argued, that because animal
cruelty statutes allow for the infliction of harm to animals as a
result of hunting, scientific activities and farming, the interest
primarily sought to be protected by these laws is something
other than the protection of animals. Although seductive at first
glance, this argument is ultimately flawed because it is prem-
ised on a misunderstanding of the structure of criminal offenses
in general and of anti-cruelty statutes in particular. Properly
understood, the existence of privileges that allow people to in-
fringe the prima facie norm against harming animals merely re-
veals society's belief (right or wrong) that countervailing reasons
justify harming the interest sought to be protected. However,
this does not mean the prohibitory norm was not really designed
to protect animals in the first place.14
In conclusion, this article will argue society has decided to
criminalize harm to animals primarily out of concern for the
wellbeing of such creatures, not because doing so furthers some
14 In criminal law terms, this can be restated in the following manner: the existence
of a justification (i.e. self-defense or choice of evils) provides the actor with reasons that
allow him to infringe the prima facie norm against engaging in such conduct (i.e. the "of-
fense"). This does not mean, however, that the existence of a justification (self-defense in
a homicide case, scientific tests in an animal cruelty case) cancels the reasons the offense
provides us for not engaging in the conduct (protecting human life in homicide, protect-
ing animals [arguably] in animal cruelty laws). See generally John Gardner, Fletcher on
Offences and Defences, 39 TULSA L. REV. 817 (2004).
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other human interest. Finally, the court's analysis in People v.
Garcia will be reexamined in light of the conclusions advanced
in this article.
I. ANIMALS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: HISTORY AND
CONTRADICTIONS
The first statute criminalizing abusive conduct towards
animals was enacted in Great Britain in 1822. The law, com-
monly known as "Martin's Act," made it a crime to cruelly beat
or otherwise mistreat horses, mules, cows, sheep or other cat-
tle. 15 At that time, cruelty to animals did not constitute an in-
dictable offense at common law. 1 6 Prior to the enactment of
Martin's Act, cruelty to animals was only deemed criminal if it
satisfied the elements of some other offense made punishable at
common law, such as breaches of the peace or malicious mis-
chief. 7 By adopting this statute, the English Parliament filled
this perceived gap in the law, representing a substantial shift in
the state of animal cruelty law. Whereas at common law, acts
that inflicted unjustifiable pain on animals were considered le-
gal wrongs only if the creature harmed was the property of an-
other, after the passage of Martin's Act such conduct was a
crime even when the injured animal was not owned by anyone.
1 8
In the United States, as in England, mistreatment of ani-
mals was first made a crime through legislation. However, in
contrast with the early statutes adopted in Great Britain, some
of the anti-cruelty laws initially enacted in America only made it
a criminal offense for someone to engage in abusive acts against
animals owned by another person. For example, an 1846 Ver-
mont statute made it a crime to "willfully and maliciously kill,
wound, maim or disfigure any horse, or horses, or horse kind,
11 David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws During the
1800's, 1993 DET. C. L. REV. 1 (discussing Martin's Act).
16 State v. Bruner, 12 N.E. 103, 104 (Ind. 1887).
17 Id. See also Respublica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 335 (Pa. 1788).
18 Favre & Tsang, supra note 15, at 4.
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cattle, sheep or swine, of another person."19  By limiting the
scope of the prohibition to acts that cause harm to animals be-
longing to someone else, the Vermont General Assembly was
making it clear that the purpose of the statute was to protect
property rights, not animals. Furthermore, by only punishing
cruelty against animals of commercial value, the legislature re-
vealed that its preeminent reason for prohibiting the conduct
was to proscribe acts that were perceived to adversely affect im-
portant economic interests.
20
Not all anti-cruelty laws adopted in America during the
nineteenth century were solely inspired by an interest to protect
property rights. Some early statutes criminalized the malicious
mistreatment of animals regardless of whether they were the
property of someone else. For instance, an 1829 New York law
made it a crime to "maliciously and cruelly beat or torture any
horse, ox or other cattle, or any sheep, whether belonging to him-
self or another.'2' By making the ownership question irrelevant,
this law signified an important change in the legal discourse
undergirding the anti-cruelty movement. Whereas laws like the
1846 Vermont statute clearly regarded the owner of the animal
as the victim of the offense, statutes like the 1829 New York law
seemed to turn this conception of anti-cruelty legislation on its
head by implying the animal, not the owner, was the legally pro-
tected interest.
It should be noted, however, that the 1829 New York law
only criminalized abusive conduct towards commercially valu-
able animals. This brings to light a tension in anti-cruelty stat-
utes that remains unresolved to this day. It is not easy to recon-
cile the status of animals as victims with the idea that only
commercially valuable creatures are worthy of protection from
wanton acts of cruelty. If the purpose of prohibiting the conduct
is to protect animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain, it
19 1846 VT. ACTS & RESOLVES 34 (emphasis added).
20 See generally Favre & Tsang, supra note 15.




is difficult to understand why economic value should condition
the scope of the statutes.
Unfortunately, albeit for different reasons, most modern
anti-cruelty statutes are plagued by similar incongruities.
While a majority of jurisdictions have expanded the scope of
anti-cruelty statutes to encompass the protection of animals that
are not generally considered to be of significant economic
value, 22 most state anti-cruelty statutes discriminate between
those individuals who harm a domesticated or companion ani-
mal and those who injure non-domesticated animals.23  Thus,
the killing of a rodent with a mousetrap inside private property
is generally not considered a crime. 24  However, causing the
death of a pet hamster is. 25 Another salient feature of modern
anti-cruelty statutes is the tendency to afford heightened legal
protection to dogs and cats. In the State of Alabama, for exam-
ple, engaging in acts of cruelty in the first degree towards a dog
or cat is a felony. 26 Nonetheless, performing identical acts on
horses, cows, rabbits, rodents or any other animal is merely a
misdemeanor.27
In view of these considerations, modern anti-cruelty stat-
utes, much like their nineteenth century counterparts, are
fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, the push to ex-
22 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-62-102 (2005) (making it a crime to unjustifiably
harm any animal in custody of a human being regardless of its economic value).
23 See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 332-378 (McKinney YEAR); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.2 (McKinney 2004). A couple of states have gone as far as arbitrarily exclud-
ing livestock from the definition of "animals" protected by their anti-cruelty laws. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 717B.1(1)(a) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(11)(b)(ii)
(2003).
See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 ANIMAL
L. 69 (1999), available at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arus5animall69.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008).
24 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 951.06 (West 2005) (prohibiting cruelty to rodents ex-
cept when poison is used on one's own premises and designed for the purpose of rodent or
pest control).
25 Id.
26 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-241 (2008).
27 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-14 (LexisNexis 2005).
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pand the number of animals protected by anti-cruelty statutes
and the increasing tendency to protect animals irrespective of
questions of ownership suggests that the purpose of adopting
these laws is to safeguard animals from unnecessary suffering.
On the other hand, the different treatment that non-companion
animals receive as opposed to domesticated creatures indicates
that the aim of these laws is something other than the protec-
tion of animals from harm. If the objective of anti-cruelty stat-
utes is to keep animals free from unnecessary suffering, why
should it matter whether the animal is domesticated? A rodent
killed by a mousetrap feels as much pain as a pet hamster killed
in a similar manner. However, only harm to the latter is
deemed criminal under the typical anti-cruelty law.
28
New York's current statute prohibiting abusive conduct to-
wards animals, commonly known as "Buster's Law," exemplifies
many of the contradictions that have been described here.29 For
starters, even though it is considered a crime to perform acts of
cruelty against any animal, it is only a felony to engage in ag-
gravated cruelty towards a "companion animal."3  Moreover,
Buster's Law contains an exemption that allows people to en-
gage in harmful acts against animals during the course of sev-
eral activities, such as fishing and hunting. 1 As a result of this
provision, the killing of a trout during a recreational fishing trip
does not constitute a punishable crime, whereas the killing of a
pet goldfish does. In light of these considerations, it is unclear
whether the chief purpose of Buster's Law is to protect animals
from the unjustifiable infliction of pain or to deter people from
engaging in acts that harm individuals with strong emotional
ties to a particular animal or animals.
Unsurprisingly, in People v. Garcia, the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York struggled to come to grips
with the conflicting rationales that seem to have underpinned
28 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.





the adoption of Buster's Law in particular and the enactment of
anti-cruelty statutes in general.3 2 While on several occasions
the court seemed to suggest that the victim of the offense was
the boy who suffered the loss of his beloved pet, on other occa-
sions it appeared to suggest that the real victim was the fish
who was unjustifiably harmed by the defendant. 3 Complicating
the matter is the fact that the court's ruling was also influenced
by the contention that cruelty to animals should be prohibited
because "man's inhumanity to man often begins with
inhumanity to those creatures that have formed particularly
close relationships with mankind."34 Consequently, the court in
Garcia elaborated three distinct (and sometimes conflicting)
theories of the harm that is sought to be prevented by anti-
cruelty statutes: (1) harm to those who have developed emo-
tional ties to the animal, (2) harm to the animal, and (3) the pos-
sibility of future harm to humans on the basis of a correlation
between violence against animals and violence against people.
35
The purpose of the remainder of this article is to evaluate
which of these differing conceptions of anti-cruelty statutes bet-
ter explains and justifies our practices of blaming and punishing
people for engaging in abusive conduct against animals. Before
doing so, however, it is necessary to briefly examine the notions
of victimhood, consent and harm.
II. VICTIMHOOD, CONSENT AND HARM
A. Victimhood
1. Preliminary Considerations
Generally speaking, a victim is a party against whom a per-
32 People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68, 69-71 (App. Div. 2006).
33 Id. at 69-71.
3 Id. at 68 (citing N.Y. Assembly Memo in Support of 1999 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1585).
36 Id. at 69-71.
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son has committed a crime.36 Therefore, the notions of "victim-
hood" and harm are intertwined. Someone is considered a vic-
tim only if he has been harmed by another person. Usually,
criminal statutes prohibit conduct that causes harm to some im-
portant interest of the victim. Thus, the typical penal code con-
tains sections that prohibit "crimes against the person," "crimes
against property," "crimes against sexual autonomy," and
"crimes against liberty." In each of these instances, a crime is
committed when someone unjustifiably interferes with the fun-
damental interests of another person. In the crime of theft, for
example, the offender unlawfully interferes with someone else's
right to private property. When someone commits homicide, he
is unjustifiably interfering with the victim's right to life. "In the
case of rape, . . . the [perpetrator] seeks pleasure by violating the
victim's fundamental right to decide how and when [he or ]she
wants to engage in sexual intercourse."3 7
It should be noted, however, that there are many crimes
whose consummation does not entail causing harm to a victim.
Most drug possession offenses represent paradigmatic examples
of these types of crimes. Take, for example, the offense of pos-
sessing marijuana for personal consumption. Note that this
conduct in no way interferes with another person's fundamental
interests. The person who commits this offense has not denied
the value of someone else's life, nor has he interfered with the
rights of others. Thus, there is no victim whose interests are
vindicated by punishing the offender.38 The perpetrator in these
cases has violated a norm, to be sure, but in doing so he or she
has not victimized anyone.
When, as in the case of drug possession offenses, the perpe-
trator's criminal conduct does not interfere with the interests of
another person, he is said to have engaged in a "victimless
36 MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIMS' RIGHTS 158 (2002).
37 Luis E. Chiesa, Taking Victims Seriously: A Dworkinian Theory of Punishment, 76




crime." Additional examples of offenses traditionally regarded
as victimless crimes are prostitution, driving while intoxicated,
and engaging in consensual sodomy.
The government may have various reasons for prohibiting
victimless crimes. Sometimes these types of offenses are created
as a way of enforcing moral principles. This is most often the
case when the state prohibits certain types of consensual sexual
conduct. The criminalization of consensual sodomy constitutes a
prime example. Even though engaging in such conduct harms
neither the persons who perform the act nor third parties, it has
been prohibited because many individuals consider sodomy to be
an act that contravenes their religious and moral beliefs.
39
Occasionally a state decides to create a victimless crime as
a way to deter people from engaging in acts that may harm
someone in the future. This tends to be the purpose of prohibit-
ing the act of driving under the influence of intoxicants. Al-
though driving while intoxicated is not harmful per se, those
who engage in such conduct are more likely to injure someone
than those who do not. In these cases, the objective of the crimi-
nal sanction shifts from exacting retribution for a harm done to
preventatively neutralizing dangerous individuals before they
engage in harmful conduct.
Sometimes, as in the case of environmental crimes, it is un-
clear whether the government has created a victimless crime.
Consider the offense of knowingly releasing hazardous pollut-
ants into the air.4" Engaging in this conduct does not directly
interfere with the interests of others. Thus, at first glance, this
offense seems to constitute a victimless crime. However, the ag-
gregate effect of pollution will almost certainly result in harm to
our health. Hence, in the long run, we are all going to be victims
of the pernicious consequences of this conduct. Due to the re-
sulting future harm, it can be coherently argued that the offense
of releasing a hazardous pollutant into the air is not a victimless
39 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 2003).
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crime despite the fact that such conduct does not directly harm
anyone at the time the act occurs.
The legitimacy of creating victimless crimes has been in-
creasingly called into question. As time has passed, societies
have become more democratic and government less authoritar-
ian, and the focus of the criminal law has shifted from the safe-
guarding of the State to the protection of persons.4 1 Once it is
accepted that the chief purpose of penal statutes is to vindicate
the rights of those that have been harmed by the perpetrator's
harmful conduct, it is difficult to justify punishing people for en-
gaging in acts that do not interfere with the rights of individu-
als. Taking this contention seriously should lead us to question
the legitimacy of creating victimless crimes, particularly when
the only reason for doing so is to enforce a particular conception
of morality by way of the criminal law.
This is not to say, however, that prohibiting conduct that
does not cause harm to a victim is necessarily illegitimate. No
one seriously believes, for example, that criminalizing the act of
driving while intoxicated is injudicious or unjustifiable. Al-
though such conduct does not entail interference with the inter-
ests of others, the undeniable dangerousness of the act seems to
provide a more than adequate reason for its prohibition. Never-
theless, in the absence of compelling reasons that point to the
contrary, victimless crimes are generally considered to be at
least prima facie or presumptively illegitimate. However, this
presumption of illegitimacy can be rebutted by demonstrating
that there are sound reasons for prohibiting the conduct.
2. Victimhood and Anti-Cruelty Statutes
It is unclear whether anti-cruelty statutes prohibit victim-
less crimes. If one considers that the chief purpose of these laws
is to protect property rights, then it should follow that there is a
legally protected victim-the owner of the harmed creature. If
conceived in this manner, animal cruelty statutes would be con-
41 DUBBER, supra note 36, at 152.
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sidered a species of the more general crime of criminal damages.
On the other hand, if one conceives laws criminalizing the
mistreatment of animals as enactments that purport to deter
people from inflicting suffering on those who have strong emo-
tional ties to the creatures, the victim of the offense would be
the person whose sensibilities were affected by the act of the
perpetrator. This conception of victimhood seemed to partially
inform the reasoning of the court in People v. Garcia.42 By im-
plying that the defendant's act revealed a heightened level of
cruelty because the killing of the goldfish caused Juan much suf-
fering, the court seemed to be suggesting the victim in these
cases is the individual who suffers when someone harms a crea-
ture that he holds dear.43
It can also be argued that cruelty to animals is a crime be-
cause those who mistreat animals are more likely to harm hu-
man beings than those who do not. If this were the case, the
purpose of punishing those who unjustifiably make animals suf-
fer would be to neutralize dangerous individuals before they en-
gage in conduct that could harm a human being. Under this
conception, cruelty to animals would constitute a victimless
crime, since the conduct is considered criminal in light of the
fact that it reveals the dangerous nature of the offender and not
because the act interferes with the rights of persons. In People
v. Garcia, the court seemed to have had this conception of anti-
cruelty statutes in mind when it asserted that these laws were
enacted in recognition that "man's inhumanity to man often
begins with inhumanity to [animals]."4
Legislation proscribing the infliction of harm on animals
can also be defended on the grounds that a majority of the
population considers such conduct to be immoral.4 5 If the
perceived immorality of unnecesarily harming animals is the
42 812 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div. 2006).
41 Id. at 69-71.
44 Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 68 (citing N.Y. Assembly Memo in Support of 1999 N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1585 (McKinney)).
46 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 17 (1965).
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sole basis for criminalization of animal cruelty, offenses
prohibiting such conduct would clearly constitute victimless
crimes.
Finally, it might be argued that the purpose of laws that
make cruelty to animals a crime is to protect the creatures from
unjustifiable inflictions of pain. Under this conception of anti-
cruelty statutes the victim of the offense is the animal harmed
by the wrongful conduct of the perpetrator. This approach
necessarily requires that we interpret the notion of "victimhood"
in a broad manner so as to allow for non-humans to qualify as
victims. Some criminal law theorists object to this expansion of
the concept noting that only autonomous beings can have their





The notions of consent and victimless crimes are inter-
twined. As a general rule, someone is considered a victim only
when he has been forced to do something that he would other-
wise not wish to do. If the person consents to the act that the al-
leged offender wanted him to perform, we would be hard-pressed
to believe that he was victimized by the offender. Therefore, a
victim's consent changes what initially appears to be an unjusti-
fiable act of forceful subjugation into a permissible act of self-
determination. 47 As Professor Dubber aptly points out: "By con-
senting, the apparent victim rebuts the presumption of victim-
hood. He indicates that another's act that facially satisfies the
elements of a crime does no harm to his autonomy in fact. In
the light of consent, an apparent act of heteronomy is revealed
as an act of autonomy. ' 4 The transformative effect of consent is
46 DUBBER, supra note 35, at 257-59.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 264.
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apparent in cases involving the alleged commission of a rape. In
these cases, the consent of the victim transforms what would
otherwise be considered a deplorable act of sexual imposition
into an unobjectionable act of lovemaking.49 By consenting to
the conduct the person is making a conscious decision about
what types of acts make his life a life worth living. Therefore, in
the absence of coercion or of legal capacity to acquiesce to the
act, the consenting victim is suffering no interference with his
rights that need to be vindicated by the infliction of punish-
ment.5 ° Upon closer inspection, it turns out that punishing
someone for performing an act to which the alleged victim con-
sented is tantamount to punishing someone for committing a
victimless crime. The reason for this is that if the victim con-
sents to the act, he is not really a victim at all. Consequently,
punishing the supposed offender for engaging in the consented
act is as objectionable as inflicting punishment on a person who
committed an act that did not cause harm to a victim.
51
Despite the undeniable transformative effects of consent,
courts have been slow to recognize the acquiescence of the victim
as a defense to criminal liability. The reticence has been more
palpable in cases involving the infliction of physical injury or
death. Thus, courts have been reluctant to allow defendants to
plead consent as a defense to the crime of assault.52 More con-
troversially, many jurisdictions have refused to recognize an in-
dividual's informed consent to euthanasia as a defense to the
crimes of murder and assisting in suicide.53
Although courts have been generally unwilling to recognize
the assent of the victim as a defense to a violent offense, consent
49 See generally Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that
Criminal Law Racognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BUFFALO
CRIM. L. REV. 503, 504-505 (2005) (discussing the morally transformative nature of
consent).
0 Id.
51 Chiesa, supra note 37.
52 See, e.g., People v. Gray, 224 Cal. App. 2d 76, 79-80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).




is widely accepted as a defense to crimes against property. It
has consistently been held that taking property does not consti-
tute theft if the owner of the item consented.5 4 Similarly, a de-
fendant cannot be found guilty of criminal mischief if the owner
of the property consented to its damage or destruction. Fur-
thermore, since the owner has the right to do what he wishes
with his property, he cannot be convicted of committing the of-
fense of criminal mischief if he decides to damage his own prop-
erty.5
2. Consent and Anti-Cruelty Statutes
The consent doctrine raises two important issues in the
context of anti-cruelty statutes. The first matter warranting
consideration is whether an animal owner's decision to inflict
pain on a creature that rightfully belongs to him is (or should
be) considered criminal. Also meriting consideration is whether
someone who harms or kills an animal is (or should be) guilty of
a crime if the owner of the creature consented to the act. The
way in which we approach these issues will depend on the con-
ception of anti-cruelty statutes that we adopt. On the one hand,
the owner's decision to allow his animal to be harmed or killed
should not generate criminal liability if one considers that the
purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect property rights. On
the other hand, if one believes that the purpose of proscribing
animal abuse is to protect animals from unjustifiable inflictions
of pain, the owner's consent to the harmful conduct should be ir-
relevant.
54 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fahlk,
524 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1994).
55 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.00 (McKinney 1999).
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C. The Harm Principle
1. Preliminary Considerations
Closely related to the question of whether it is legitimate to
punish people for committing a victimless crime is the doctrine
that has come to be called the "harm principle." First elaborated
by the famous philosopher John Stuart Mill, this principle has
been employed as a means to limit the government's power to
criminalize conduct. According to his formulation of the doc-
trine, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others."56 As a result of this, Mill con-
cluded that the government could not legitimately prohibit an
act solely to promote the physical or moral wellbeing of the per-
son engaging in the conduct. 7 Furthermore, he asserted that
the fact that most people consider the performance of a particu-
lar act to be wrong or unwise is not a sufficient reason to war-
rant criminalizing the conduct.
58
Mill's thesis was later echoed and further developed by the
legal theorist H. L. A. Hart. Hart believed that to prohibit con-
duct merely because it is considered immoral is illegitimate be-
cause doing so would contradict fundamental liberty interests.59
He also stated that the distress people feel when others conduct
themselves in what they consider to be an immoral fashion can-
not constitute a punishable harm, since this would be "tanta-
mount to punishing them simply because others object to what
they do; and the only liberty that could coexist with this exten-
sion of the utilitarian principle [("harm principle")] is liberty to
do those things to which no one seriously objects. Such liberty
plainly is quite nugatory."6 " In other words, according to Hart,
6 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10-11 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978).
57 Id.
5s Id.




criminalizing acts because of their immorality is illegitimate be-
cause it assigns only trifling importance to the fundamental
right of individual autonomy.
61
One important consequence of the harm principle is that it
casts doubt on the propriety of criminalizing an act merely be-
cause of its dangerousness. Prohibiting such conduct is prob-
lematic because "[t]hese offenses do not proscribe harm itself,
but rather the possibility of harm-a possibility that need not
(and typically does not) materialize when the offense is commit-
ted."62 There are myriad examples of non-harmful acts that are
considered criminal solely because they create risks of harms.
Perhaps the most prevalent one is the criminalization of the un-
authorized possession of a weapon. Although the mere posses-
sion of a weapon is not harmful to anyone, it presumably in-
creases the risk that the possessor might use it to injure
someone. The justifiability of making use of this type of offense
as a way of neutralizing dangerous offenders before they engage
in harmful conduct is unclear. It is safe to say, however, that
the more concrete the risk sought to be prevented by the offense
is, the more justifiable it is to criminalize the conduct. Con-
versely, as the inherent dangerousness of the conduct decreases,
the reasons in favor of criminalizing the act get progressively
weaker. Compare, for example, the relative merits of the deci-
sion to criminalize the possession of tools commonly used for
criminal purposes with the prohibition of the possession of
weapons. Whereas most people seem to believe that criminaliz-
ing the latter is justifiable, there are considerable doubts with
regards to whether prohibiting the former is proper. The key to
explaining this distinction lies in the inherent dangerousness of
the items involved. Thus, it has been asserted that an "account
of the difference between weapons ... and burglary tools ... is
that the former are dangerous or thought to be dangerous to all
61 Luis E. Chiesa, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of
Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 102, 131 (2007).
62 Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 771 (2004) (em-
phasis added).
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those who might come in contact with them [whereas the latter
are not]. '"63 Since weapons pose a more serious risk of causing
grave harm to others than tools, the decision to criminalize their
possession is more defensible than the choice to prohibit possess-
ing tools.
While the harm principle initially afforded courts and
commentators with an effective tool with which to condemn the
enactment of laws that were adopted to enforce public morality,
the principle has been criticized because of the malleability and
vagueness of the concept of "harm."64 Many statutes that appear
to prohibit conduct solely as a way of enforcing moral principles
can be easily recast as enactments that aim to prevent the cau-
sation of indirect harm. Thus, Professor Catharine MacKinnon
has argued that governmental regulation of pornography, once
thought to be at odds with the harm principle, can be justified
on morally neutral grounds because it is harmful to women since
it perpetuates sexism, promotes the subjugation of women and
fosters inequality.65 In a similar fashion, former New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani justified his crackdown on sex shops
and peep shows in Times Square by focusing on the indirect so-
cietal harm that they cause, not on their immorality.
66
Despite its shortcomings, the harm principle serves to limit
the government's power of criminalization by requiring that the
state provide reasons for prohibiting conduct other than the fact
that it is generally considered to be immoral. In some cases, the
state can justify prohibiting conduct by pointing to its evident
6 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 200 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
6 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
65 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985).
6 See Mike Allen, Giuliani Tells Sex-Based Shops That the End is Drawing Near,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1998, available at
http://query.nytimes.comgst/fullpage.html?res=9406E4D61030F933A15754 COA96E9582
60&sec=&spon= (stating that Mayor Giuliani believed sex-based shops to be corrosive




dangerousness (drunk driving, for example) or by demonstrating
that the long term benefits of proscribing what would otherwise
appear to be an innocuous act justifies criminalizing such con-
duct (banning certain pornographic materials as a way of curb-
ing sexism and discrimination, for example). However, the gov-
ernment will occasionally not be able to provide reasons for
criminalizing conduct besides its perceived immorality. The
prohibition of certain sexual acts provides a case in point. In the
landmark decision of Lawrence v. Texas 7 , for example, the
United States Supreme Court had to decide whether a law mak-
ing consensual sodomy a crime violated the liberty interests pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.6"
In language that closely mirrors Mill's formulation of the harm
principle, the Court justified striking down the statute by point-
ing out that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."6 9
2. The Harm Principle and Anti-Cruelty Statutes
The famous English jurist Lord Devlin once argued that
anti-cruelty statutes were solely enacted as a way of publicly
enforcing the widely shared view that unjustifiably inflicting
pain on an animal is immoral.7 °  If Lord Devlin's
characterization of such laws is correct, criminalizing the
mistreatment of animals would seem to violate the harm
principle. This would cast doubt on the legitimacy of enacting
such legislation.
Lord Devlin's conception of anti-cruelty statutes is by no
means universally held. In a famous reply to Devlin, H. L. A.
Hart pointed out that:
It is too often assumed that if a law is not designed to protect
67 559 U.S. 558 (2003).
s Id.
69 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
70 DEVLIN, supra note 45 at 17.
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one man from another its only rationale can be that it is
designed to punish moral wickedness or, in Lord Devlin's
words, "to enforce a moral principle." Thus it is often urged
that statutes punishing cruelty to animals can only be
explained in that way. But it is certainly intelligible, both as
an account of the original motives inspiring such legislation
and as the specification of an aim widely held to be worth
pursuing, to say that the law is here concerned with the
suffering, albeit only of animals, rather than with the
immorality of torturing them. Certainly no one who supports
this use of the criminal law is thereby bound in consistency to
admit that the law may punish forms of immorality which
involve no suffering to any sentient being.
7 1
Thus, anti-cruelty legislation does not violate the harm
principle, as long as we interpret the principle as one that allows
for the justifiable imposition of punishment whenever the actor's
conduct causes harm to another sentient being, that is, a human
or animal.
III. THE INTERESTS SOUGHT TO BE PROTECTED BY ANTI-CRUELTY
STATUTES: FIVE PLAUSIBLE THEORIES
A. Protection of Property
1. The Case in Favor of Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Way of Protecting Property Interests
Professor Gary Francione recently stated that, "as far as
the law is concerned, ... animals are nothing more than com-
modities."7 2  This has led him and many others7 ' to conclude
that, for all relevant legal purposes, animals are treated as
71 HART, supra note 59, at 34 (footnote omitted).
72 Gary L. Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain With-
out Thunder, 70 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (2007).
73 See, e.g., David N. Cassuto, Bred Meat: The Cultural Foundation of the Factory
Farm, 70 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 77 (2007).
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property. As a result, this tempts the conclusion that the pur-
pose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect humans' property in-
terests in animals.
The contention that the purpose of prohibiting abusive con-
duct against animals is to protect property rights finds some his-
torical support. As was discussed in Part I of this article, cruelty
to animals was not a crime at common law."4 At the time, kill-
ing or harming an animal would be considered an offense only if
doing so satisfied some other crime punishable at common law.75
If any such offense were to be infringed, it would typically be a
crime against property such as trespass or criminal mischief.
Similarly, the first American anti-cruelty statute only made it
punishable for someone to mistreat animals belonging to an-
other person. 76 Therefore, the owner of the creature was origi-
nally free to inflict as much pain on the animal as he saw fit.
Recent enactments have generally broadened the scope of
anti-cruelty offenses to nominally encompass the protection of
most animals, including those that are not owned by anyone.77
This might suggest that, contrary to their nineteenth century
counterparts, modern anti-cruelty statutes protect interests
other than property. It should be noted, however, that some as-
pects of these laws do seem to perpetuate the notion that anti-
cruelty statutes are enacted primarily as a way of protecting
private property. Consider, for example, how the protection af-
forded to certain animals, such as fish or birds, depends on
whether they belong to someone or not. Most statutes generally
authorize people to harm fish or birds if they do so while fishing
or hunting.78 Since no one has a claim of right over these ani-
mals while they are living in the wild, at least until they catch,
trap or kill them, harming them does not affect any property in-
terest. However, the legal protection afforded to these creatures
74 See supra Part I.
75 See supra Part I.
76 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
77 See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353-a(1) (McKinney 2004).
78 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 717B.2(5) (West 2003).
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substantially increases once the animal belongs to someone.
Thus, the acquisition of property rights over these kinds of ani-
mals has a significant transformative effect. Before they become
private property, many people are free to harm them. However,
once someone has a claim of right over the creature, no one, with
the possible exception of the owner, can lawfully mistreat the
animal.
It is worth mentioning that if the intended protection of
anti-cruelty statutes is a property interest, the victim of such
crimes would be the owner of the animal, not the creature itself.
If conceived in this manner, these statutes should not be re-
garded as enacting a victimless crime. Furthermore, if the rea-
son for criminalizing the mistreatment of animals is to avoid
harm to property, the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes also
satisfies the harm principle.
2. The Case Against Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a Way
of Protecting Property Interests
Even though a property-based conception of anti-cruelty
statutes adequately explains certain features of these laws, it
fails to account for some of their most distinctive characteristics.
Consider the significant protection given to dogs and cats in
most jurisdictions (mistreating a dog or cat is considered a fel-
ony in many states, whereas mistreating some other animal is
not). 9 The increased degree of protection provided to these
animals does not depend on whether someone owns them. Thus,
torturing a stray dog is considered a felony in most states re-
gardless of whether someone has a claim of right over the ani-
mal. o
Property-based conceptions of anti-cruelty laws are also dif-
ficult to reconcile with statutes that make it a crime to encour-
age dog or cockfighting. Such conduct is considered an offense




in all fifty states.' Interestingly, the act remains criminal even
if the owners of the animals voluntarily decide to engage in the
activity.12 Since these laws protect animals in circumstances in
which doing so will be detrimental to the pecuniary interests of
their owners, the protection conferred in this context is incom-
patible with the position that anti-cruelty statutes are primarily
enacted as a way to advance property interests.
It should also be noted that every jurisdiction makes it
criminal for the owner of a pet to mistreat his animal.83  The
adoption of this type of legislation is at odds with a property-
based conception of anti-cruelty statutes because the unqualified
protection afforded to pets against harmful acts of their owners
is contrary to the general principle of property law that an
owner has a right to do what he wishes to his property, includ-
ing destroying or damaging it.
B. Protection Against Emotional Harm
1. The Case in Favor of Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Means of Protecting Humans Against the Infliction of Emotional
Harm
It might be cogently argued that the chief purpose of anti-
cruelty statutes is to prevent people from causing harm to per-
sons with strong emotional ties to a mistreated animal. The
"emotional harm" conception dovetails in several important re-
spects with the property-based approach to animal cruelty laws.
81 7 U.S.C.A. § 2156 (2006). See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 351 (McKinney
2004 & Supp. 2007). The only U.S. jurisdiction in which cockfighting is not considered a
crime is Puerto Rico. The reason for this seems to lie in the cultural and historical sig-
nificance that cockfighting has for many people on the island, particularly those who are
over sixty and live in rural areas. Id.
S2 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 717B.3.A(1) (West 2003) (stating that a person is
guilty of animal torture, regardless of whether the person is the owner of the animal).
83 For information on the animal cruelty laws in each state, see Michigan State Uni-
versity College of Law, http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/topicstatutes/sttoac.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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Since the owners of animals often develop strong emotional ties
to their animals, they will typically be the ones who suffer the
most when someone unjustifiably harms their pets. Ownership,
however, is not necessarily determinative of whether someone
has developed a close emotional relationship with the animal.
One can easily imagine instances in which the owner of the crea-
ture has no affective attachment to his pet. By the same token,
one can conceive many instances in which someone other than
the owner has cultivated a close sentimental link with the ani-
mal. As a result, ownership is typically, though not necessarily,
indicative of a significant emotional bond with the animal.
However, under this conception of anti-cruelty statutes, the ul-
timate purpose of these laws is to protect people from suffering
emotional harm, not to safeguard their property interests.
The emotional harm approach to animal cruelty laws is
particularly apt for explaining the heightened level of legal pro-
tection that is traditionally afforded to companion animals. Ac-
cording to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (ASPCA), companion animals are "domesticated or do-
mestic-bred animals whose physical, emotional, behavioral and
social needs can be readily met as companions in the home, or in
close daily relationship with humans."8 4 This definition is simi-
lar to the ones adopted in the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States. 5 Thus, by definition, companion animals are
those creatures that are more likely to have close and significant
ties with human beings.8 6 Consequently, if one believes that the
principal aim of anti-cruelty statutes is to prevent people from
engaging in conduct that can sever the strong link that unites
84 ASPCA Policies and Positions 2.2, (2008),
http://www.aspca.org/sitelPageServer?pagename=pp-cndefinition (last visited Oct. 20,
2008).
85 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-351a (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); 510 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 70/2.01-a (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §343.20 (West 2004); N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007).
86 People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846, 851-52 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (stating that one of the
reasons why a goldfish is a companion animal is because such pets are beloved by their
owners and are not to be killed or eaten).
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animals and humans, it makes sense to protect companion ani-
mals more than other creatures.
So conceived, animal-cruelty statutes would seem to satisfy
the harm principle, for the principal reason that criminalizing
the conduct would avoid emotional harm to others. Further-
more, these statutes would not create victimless crimes, since
there is a victim whose interests are vindicated by punishing
those who infringe the norm against harming animals-the hu-
man with close ties to the creature.
This appeared to be the conception of animal cruelty laws
that the lower court had in mind in Garcia, when it seemed to
suggest that the defendant's actions evinced an increased degree
of cruelty because they were calculated to inflict suffering on the
person with the closest emotional ties to the pet goldfish-
Juan.87 By focusing on the impact that the perpetrator's conduct
had on the boy instead of the harm that the act caused to the
animal, the court was clearly implying that the principal aim of
the statute is to prevent human suffering, not to protect animals
from unjustifiable inflictions of pain.
2. The Case Against Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Means of Protecting Humans Against the Infliction of Emotional
Harm
The proposition that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is
to protect humans from emotional harm cannot be easily recon-
ciled with the broad scope of typical animal cruelty laws. Take,
for example, South Dakota's animal cruelty statute.8 This law
makes it a crime to harm any "mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian
or fish '89 by engaging in any "act or omission whereby unneces-
sary, unjustifiable or unreasonable physical pain or suffering is
caused, permitted or allowed to continue including acts of muti-
87 People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71 (App. Div. 2006).
8 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-29-11 (1995).
89 § 40-1-1(2) (2002).
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lation."9 The statute protects many animals, like reptiles and
amphibians, that typically do not have close, daily relationships
with humans.9 1 Giving legal protection to such animals is diffi-
cult to explain under an emotional harm approach to animal
cruelty statutes. Furthermore, harming stray dogs or cats is
considered a crime even if no one has developed a strong emo-
tional bond with the animals. This is the case even if most or all
members of the community despise the creature harmed. As far
as the law is concerned, animals are deemed worthy of legal pro-
tection whether or not they are liked.
Finally, the emotional harm approach to animal cruelty
statutes cannot satisfactorily account for the widespread prohi-
bition of dog fighting and cockfighting.9 2 Most of the people who
participate in this type of activity treat the animals involved ei-
ther as a source of income or as entertainment. Moreover, they
are evidently aware of the fact that many of the animals will
suffer great pain and/or death as a result of the fights. Since the
people involved in these sports treat the animals involved as
disposable objects that exist solely to generate money or pleas-
ure, it cannot be said that the principal reason for criminalizing
dog or cock fighting is to prevent psychological harm to those
who have developed close ties to the animals. In these cases
conduct is made criminal, despite the fact that the people gener-
ally associated with these events do not suffer when the animals
are in pain. Typically, the opposite seems to be true: they enjoy
watching the creatures suffer.
9 § 40-1-2.2 (2002).
91 § 40-1-1(2) (2002).
92 For a list of animal fighting statutes enacted in the United States, see Michigan
State University College of Law,
http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/topicstatutes/sttoaf.htm (last visited Oct.31, 2008).
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C. Prevention of Future Harm to Humans
1. The Case in Favor of Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Means of Preventing Future Harm to Humans
Perhaps the mainstream belief with regard to animal cru-
elty statutes is that they are enacted as a way of identifying and
neutralizing presumptively dangerous individuals before they
engage in acts that are harmful to human beings. 3 The phi-
losophical roots of the "future harm" view can be traced back to
Immanuel Kant, who once famously stated, "he who is cruel to
animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men. We can
judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals." 4
Defenders of this approach to anti-cruelty statutes believe
that criminalizing the mistreatment of animals is warranted be-
cause "[t]here is ample evidence to suggest that individuals who
engage in acts of animal cruelty have a greater probability of
committing acts of violence against people as compared to indi-
viduals who have no history of committing acts of violence
against animals."9 5 This conception is so prevalent that many
organizations devoted to the protection of animals have de-
fended it in an effort to justify the enactment of broader anti-
cruelty legislation. The First Strike campaign of the Humane
Society constitutes one such example. The purpose of this pro-
gram is to reduce animal abuse by "rais[ing] public and profes-
sional awareness about the connection between animal cruelty
and other violent crime violence and to help communities iden-
tify some of the origins of violence, predict its patterns, and pre-
vent its escalation. 96
93 See, e.g., Garcia v. People, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 2006) (stating the con-
cern with the connection between animal abusers and violence towards humans as a rea-
son for enacting anti-cruelty statutes).
94 Immanuel Kant, Duties in Regard to Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN
OBLIGATIONS 23, 24 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989).
95 Charlotte A. Lacroix, Another Weapon for Combating Family Violence: Prevention
of Animal Abuse, 4 Animal L. 1, 8 (1998).
96 The Humane Society of the United States, First Strike: The Connection Between
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There is significant evidence tending to demonstrate that a
correlation between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence
exists. Anecdotal confirmation of this link abounds. Some of the
most famous serial killers, including Jeffrey Dahmer, the Son of
Sam, the Boston Strangler and Ted Bundy had a history of abus-
ing animals.97 Empirical evidence also seems to substantiate
the correlation. According to some studies, "animal abusers are
five times more likely to commit violent crimes ... [and] four
times more likely to commit property crimes" than those who do
not mistreat animals.
98
Adoption of the future harm conception of animal-cruelty
statutes should lead to punishing only those acts showing a cor-
relation to interpersonal violence. This might explicate why it is
typically not considered criminal to harm animals during the
course of certain activities, such as fishing, hunting and farm-
ing. Since there is no significant link between engaging in these
activities and violence against people, those who believe that
animal-cruelty statutes should be adopted as a way of prevent-
ing future harm to humans do not have legitimate reasons for
punishing this conduct.
The Garcia court expressly recognized that one of the con-
siderations that motivated the adoption of New York's anti-
cruelty statute was the connection between animal abuse and
violent crimes.9 9 This was such a preeminent concern of law-
makers that then Governor Pataki defended the proposed
amendments to the anti-cruelty statutes by pointing out that
"gruesome acts [of torture endured by animals], coupled with re-
cent studies that reveal a correlation between violence against
animals and future acts of violence against humans, underscore
Animal Cruelty and Human Violence,
http://www.hsus.orgthsus_field/first-strike-theconnectionbetween-animal-cruelty-and
-human-violence/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
97 Lacroix, supra note 95, at 8; Joseph G. Sauder, Enacting and Enforcing Felony
Animal Cruelty Laws to Prevent Violence Against Humans 6 Animal L. 1, 14 n.114
(2000).
98 Sauder, supra note 97, at 13.
9 Garcia v. People, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 2006).
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the need to enhance penalties for animal cruelty."100
2. The Case Against Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Means of Preventing Future Harm to Humans
According to the future harm conception of anti-cruelty
statutes, the purpose of enacting laws criminalizing animal
abuse is to identify dangerous individuals before they decide to
harm a human being. If this were the case, the justifiability of
adopting such laws would be questionable because doing so
would violate the harm principle. Since the aim to prevent pos-
sible harm-future injury to humans-by criminalizing animal
cruelty does not always transpire, it cannot be held that such
conduct is prohibited because it causes direct harm to others, as
the harm principle would require.
Furthermore, a legislature would be creating a victimless
crime if it proscribed animal mistreatment solely because of its
correlation with interpersonal violence. By ascertaining that the
purpose of animal cruelty statutes is to avoid injury to a victim
in the future, the legislature is implying that the perpetrator's
present conduct does not yet interfere with personal interests.
As was previously discussed, the legitimacy of prohibiting con-
duct that does not violate the rights of a victim is unclear. 10 1
The future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes inevita-
bly leads to shifting the focus of these laws from avoiding harm
to animals to neutralizing presumptively dangerous individuals.
Therefore, as one commentator has suggested, the decision to
criminalize abusive treatment of animals as a way to prevent
possible future harm to humans is grounded on the "recognition
that the solution to a violent society does not lie in the charac-
terization of the victim but in the characteristics of the of-
fender."1 2 This might explain why the Garcia court suggested
100 Jennifer S. Rosa, Recent Development in New York Law, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
287, 297 (2000) (quoting Governor George E. Pataki's Approval Memorandum 3, A. 8338-
A signed as Chapter 118, 222nd Legis. Sess. (June 28, 1999)).
101 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
102 Lacroix, supra note 95, at 3.
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that the key to determining whether the defendant should be
convicted of a felony because his act evinced a heightened degree
of cruelty required an examination of his state of mind instead
of an assessment of the amount of pain inflicted on the pet gold-
fish.113 If the principal purpose of anti-cruelty laws is to prevent
future harm to humans, the gradation of punishment for animal
abuse should be dependent on the perceived dangerousness of
the offender and not on the actual anguish endured by the crea-
ture. This is somewhat counterintuitive. Why should a finding
of aggravated cruelty depend on anything other than an evalua-
tion of the degree and extent of the suffering of the victim?
It is also worth mentioning that the future harm conception
of laws proscribing animal abuse cannot satisfactorily account
for two distinctive features of modern anti-cruelty legislation,
namely, the criminalization of negligent mistreatment of pets
and the prohibition of cockfighting. Empirical studies demon-
strate that there is a correlation between intentional acts of cru-
elty against animals and interpersonal violence. 10 4 Thus, re-
searchers have been quick to point out that many murderers
have a history of intentionally harming animals by, for example,
setting them on fire.1 0 5 However, no proven link exists between
negligent mistreatment of pets and future acts of violence
against humans. 6 The person who carelessly forgets to ar-
range to have her pet fed during a vacation is guilty of animal
abuse, despite the fact that performing such conduct does not
substantially increase the likelihood that the pet owner will
harm a human being in the future.
Similarly, participating in cockfighting is a crime although
103 Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
104 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
105 Sauder, supra note 97, at 14.
106 Stephen R. Kellert & Alan R. Felthous, Childhood Cruelty Toward Animals
Among Criminals and Non-Criminals, in CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 194, 208 (Randall Lockwood & Frank R. Ascione eds., 1998). This study dis-
cusses intentional acts of violence against humans and the link with violent behavior
towards animals, but does not suggest negligent treatment of animals has a link with
future harm to humans.
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the people involved in it are typically no more likely to engage in
violent interpersonal crime than those who do not partake in
such activities. The absence of a correlation between participa-
tion in cockfighting and violence against humans is particularly
evident in the case of the many Latinos who view the practice of
breeding and training fighting cocks as a family and cultural
tradition.107 It would be absurd to argue that the Latinos who
participate in cockfighting are more prone to inflicting harm on
humans than the average person. Thus, the future harm con-
ception of anti-cruelty statutes is a particularly weak basis upon
which to ground the criminalization of cockfighting. It seems
obvious that such spectacles are banned in order to avoid unjus-
tifiable harm to animals, not as a means of preventing future
possible harm to humans.
D. Enforcement of Moral Views Held by a Majority of the
Population
1. The Case in Favor of Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Means of Enforcing a Moral Principle
Various courts and commentators (most notably, Lord Dev-
lin) have posited that the chief purpose of anti-cruelty legisla-
tion is to promote a moral view held by a majority of the popula-
tion. 108  Proponents of the "public enforcement of morality"
conception argue the perceived immorality of the conduct justi-
fies its criminalization.
09
This conception is appealing because most people do believe
that unjustifiably inflicting harm on an animal is immoral.
Thus, the elegance of this view lies in its simplicity. Why should
107 See Cockfighting Still Popular in Puerto Rico, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 25, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012500500.html (discussing cock fighting as a tra-
dition and considered a gentleman's sport in country of Puerto Rico).
108 Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and Legal Welfarism: "Unnecessary" Suffer-




we not criminalize that which most, if not all, deem to be a mor-
ally objectionable course of action?
Another advantage of the public enforcement of morality
conception is that it can satisfactorily explain why it is generally
not considered criminal to harm animals during the course of
certain activities such as fishing and hunting. Since most people
consider that fishing and hunting constitute instances of morally
acceptable behavior, no moral principle would be promoted by
proscribing such conduct.
This view of animal cruelty legislation also succeeds where
most other approaches fail. The criminalization of dog fighting
and cockfighting is easily explicable under this conception.
These activities were not considered criminal in the past be-
cause at that time there was no clear consensus with regard to
whether or not engaging in such behavior was deemed immoral.
However, as time has passed and societal values have changed,
different groups of people have coalesced in decrying the immor-
ality of animal abuse. The crystallization of this moral consen-
sus paved the way for the proscription of the conduct in modern
times.
2. The Case Against Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes
as a Means of Enforcing a Moral Principle
The principal objection that can be leveled against the pub-
lic enforcement of morality view of animal cruelty statutes is
that most courts and commentators believe that the fact that a
majority of the population believes that a certain act is immoral
is not in itself a sufficient reason for criminalizing the conduct.
The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v.
Texas is worth repeating: "[T]he fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as im-
moral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting
the practice. 110
110 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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Furthermore, this conception of anti-cruelty legislation is
wholly incompatible with the harm principle.111 Taking this
principle seriously requires that we only proscribe conduct that
interferes with the rights of others. However, no one has a right
to have his own moral views publicly enforced by way of the
criminal law. This is the case even when a person's moral prin-
ciples coincide with those held by a substantial portion of the
population. People should not have to endure punishment and
the deprivation of liberty and/or property that it entails just be-
cause many object to his conduct on purely moral grounds. In a
tolerant and pluralistic society, something in addition to the
perceived immorality of the actor's conduct must be shown be-
fore we deem that person a criminal.
E. Prevention of Harm to Animals
1. The Case in Favor of Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes as a
Means of Preventing Harm to Animals
Perhaps the interest sought to be protected by anti-cruelty
statutes is the prevention of harm to animals. After all, these
laws are typically referred to as animal cruelty statutes. The
view that these laws aim to protect animals from the unjustifi-
able infliction of pain has much to commend it. For starters, it
seems to explain the most salient features of modern anti-
cruelty legislation. The decisions to criminalize the negligent
mistreatment of pets and to proscribe dog fighting and cockfight-
ing can easily be accounted for under this conception. Since neg-
ligently mistreating animals causes them to suffer unnecessar-
ily, it is perfectly sensible to proscribe such conduct in order to
protect the creatures. Similarly, given that dogs and cocks used
in fights endure incredible amounts of pain, there are legitimate
reasons to prohibit the fights as a means of furthering the pro-
tection of the animals involved.
1-I See supra Part I1.C (discussing harm principle).
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Moreover, contrary to the public enforcement of morality
view, the conception of anti-cruelty statutes discussed in this
section is compatible with the harm principle.1 12 As H. L. A.
Hart has rightly pointed out, criminalizing animal abuse does
not violate this principle as long as we construe it in such a way
that allows for the criminalization of conduct that harms a sen-
tient being.113 The proscription of conduct that interferes with
the fundamental interests of others is universally held to be le-
gitimate. Thus, provided that we consider animals to have inter-
ests worthy of legal protection, there should be no objection to
prohibiting animal abuse. Fortunately, most people now believe
animals have an interest in being held free from unnecessary
suffering. This basic interest stems from an animal's sentience,
that is, from their capacity to experience pain. Since our experi-
ence has led us to conclude that feeling pain is an unpleasant oc-
currence, we have good reason to abstain ourselves from causing
pain to other beings, human or not.
As long as anti-cruelty statutes are conceived as laws that
protect animals from enduring direct suffering, they would not
constitute victimless crimes. So conceived, the legally protected
victim would be the creature harmed by the perpetrator's con-
duct. Some would object to this conceptualization of victimhood
by pointing out that only human beings should qualify as vic-
tims.1 This argument would only hold, however, if there were
some distinctive human characteristic beyond the capacity to
feel pain that might justify affording humans more legal protec-
tion than animals. Professor Dubber believes human capacity
for exercising meaningful autonomy over their lives warrants
such a differentiated treatment. 1 5 The problem with this con-
tention is that humans are considered victims even if they lack
the capacity to meaningfully exercise their autonomy. A newly
born child, for example, has no more capacity for autonomy than
112 Id.
113 HART, supra note 59, at 34.




a dog or a monkey. Nevertheless, if someone were to harm such
a child, no one would seriously contend that he should not be
considered a victim of a crime. So it would seem that, in cases
such as these, the defining characteristic of victimhood is sen-
tience, not autonomy.
Nonetheless, this does not mean there are never sound rea-
sons for legally discriminating between humans and animals. It
could be coherently argued, for example, that in light of their
unique capacity for autonomy, humans should never be consid-
ered the property of anyone else. However, since animals pre-
sumably do not understand or care about notions of ownership,
their interests in not being considered property are arguably
weaker than interests humans have regarding the same issue.
Some scholars, like Gary Francione, argue there is such a
thing as "animal autonomy" that should be considered worthy of
legal protection.116 If this were the case, the reasons for dis-
criminating between animals and humans, at least with regard
to questions about the legitimacy of owning such beings, disap-
pear. However, one need not agree with this proposition in or-
der to defend the notion that animals should qualify as victims.
For this limited purpose, their capacity to feel pain appears to
suffice.
2. The Case Against Conceiving Anti-Cruelty Statutes
as a Means of Preventing Harm to Animals
The conception that anti-cruelty statutes are enacted as a
way of protecting animals against the unjustifiable infliction of
pain appears to conflict with certain features of these laws. Par-
ticularly difficult to explain under this view is the fact that it is
not a punishable crime to harm an animal during the course of
fishing or hunting activities. If these statutes really aim to pre-
vent harm to animals, what superior interest might justify
harming them during the course of fishing or hunting activities?




While it may be argued the economic and entertainment in-
terests furthered by these activities justify harming animals,
many will find these reasons for engaging in the conduct unsat-
isfying. However, one would be mistaken to conclude that, in
light of these considerations, the purpose of animal cruelty stat-
utes is not to protect animals. It might be argued that although
these laws do in fact protect animals, they assign too much
weight to countervailing interests that might justify an infrac-
tion of the prohibition. Thus, the problem does not lie with the
purpose of the statute, which is by and large a salutary one, but
with the scope of the reasons that might justify what would oth-
erwise constitute a nominal infraction of the law. In order to
fully understand this argument, a discussion of the structure of
criminal offenses, generally, and of anti-cruelty statutes, in par-
ticular, is warranted.
IV. ACTIVITIES HARMFUL TO ANIMALS EXEMPTED FROM
PUNISHMENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND
ANTI- CRUELTY STATUTES
A. The Claim
Since anti-cruelty statutes are riddled with exceptions al-
lowing people to harm animals, animal law scholars frequently
claim this demonstrates these statutes are enacted to ensure
humans continue to exploit rather than protect animals. 1 7 Ac-
ceptance of this proposition typically leads to odd interpretations
of animal cruelty laws. Take, for example, the views espoused
by Professor Taimie Bryant in a recent article. In discussing the
way in which the criminal law deals with cases involving harm
caused to egg-laying chickens, she stated that:
[T]he law does not identify as "cruel" the practices that directly
cause their suffering. If the suffering of these hens is deemed
17 See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 131-32 (1996).
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"necessary" for the eggs they supply to humans, then that suf-
fering simply doesn't count in legal terms, nor does the suffer-
ing of the humans who care about that suffering.
1 i8
This reading misapprehends the conceptual structure of
criminal offenses by confusing the inculpatory (whether the suf-
fering of the hens "counts" as legally relevant harm) and excul-
patory (whether there are reasons that justify the infliction of
legally relevant suffering) dimensions of animal cruelty statutes.
This, in turn, leads to a failure to grasp the communicative
meaning of the exceptions that plague the laws prohibiting ani-
mal abuse.
In the remainder of this section, the structure of punishable
crimes is explored in an attempt to (1) substantiate my conten-
tion the aforementioned reading of animal cruelty offenses is
misguided and (2) demonstrate why it is not true that the excep-
tions that plague these laws reveal that they are primarily en-
acted to further human wellbeing rather than to protect animals
from unjustifiable harm.
B. A Primer on the Conceptual Structure of Criminal Offenses
1. The Inculpatory vs. Exculpatory Dimension of Punishable
Crimes and the Offense/Justification Distinction
Punishable crimes have both an inculpatory and an excul-
patory dimension.11 9 A person that engages in conduct that sat-
isfies the elements of an offense inculpates himself.12 ° Thus,
David incriminates himself if he kills a human being, that is, he
satisfies the elements of the offense of homicide. Furthermore, a
person who has performed an act that satisfies the elements of
an offense has engaged in conduct that is prima facie wrongful.
Consequently, David's act of killing a human being is, all things
118 Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J. ANIAL L. &
ETHICS 63, 76 (2006) (emphasis added).
119 See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 63, at 562.
120 Id.
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being equal, prima facie unlawful.' 21
This, of course, does not mean that conduct that satisfies
the elements of an offense is necessarily wrongful. An actor may
escape liability, despite having inculpated himself by infringing
the elements of an offense, if he can successfully plead a justifi-
cation defense.' 22 Therefore, if David can demonstrate that he
acted in justifiable self-defense, he will not be punished even
though he engaged in conduct that was prima facie wrongful.
The presence of justificatory conditions such as self-defense or
necessity transforms the actor's prima facie wrongful act into
conduct that is, all things being considered, not wrongful.123
It should be noted that conduct may be considered lawful
either because it does not inculpate the actor, that is, it does not
satisfy the elements of an offense, or because it should be excul-
pated in light of the presence of circumstances which provide the
actor with reasons for engaging in the prima facie wrongful act,
namely, a justification defense. It would be a mistake, however,
to conclude the actor's acquittal in both of these instances means
the same thing. The next subsection will demonstrate the fun-
damental difference between conduct that is not wrongful be-
cause it does not satisfy the elements of an offense and conduct
that is lawful because it is justified. This distinction proves to
be crucial to a proper analysis of the structure and meaning of
anti-cruelty offenses.
121 See Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons
Theory of Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 117-18 (2007).
122 An actor can also avoid liability by pleading an excuse defense such as insanity.
123 Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime, in 1
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 17, 37 (George P. Fletcher &
Albin Eser eds., 1987).
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2. The Communicative Significance of the Offense/Justification
Distinction
a. Harmful vs. Non-Harmful Legal Conduct
The communicative significance of the offense/justification
distinction can be illustrated by examining the difference be-
tween the acts of shooting at a piece of paper and shooting at a
person in self-defense. 124 The act of shooting at a piece of paper
is lawful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense
made criminal by our laws. Since this conduct is not prohibited,
engaging in it does not cause harm to an interest protected by
law. Thus, the act of shooting at a piece of paper, like any other
conduct that does not satisfy the elements of an offense, is ir-
relevant for the criminal law.
Shooting at a human being in self-defense is also lawful.
However, in contrast with the act of shooting at a piece of paper,
this conduct satisfies the elements of assault.1 25 Given that this
conduct is prohibited, performing it interferes with a physical
integrity interest that is otherwise protected by the law. Obvi-
ously, the injury caused to the person who was shot counts as
harm as far as the law is concerned. Therefore, the act of shoot-
ing at a person is relevant for the criminal law, even though it is
not wrongful since self-defense is a justificatory circumstance.
As one can see, these acts are lawful due to very distinct
reasons. The act of shooting at a piece of paper does not satisfy
the elements of an offense, because it does not cause harm to an
interest the law seeks to protect. Hence, the law does not pro-
vide us with reasons to abstain from engaging in the act. Con-
trarily, the act of shooting at a person in self-defense satisfies
124 This is a variation of an example proposed by Hans Welzel, one of the greatest
German criminal law scholars of the twentieth century, as a way to illustrate the of-
fense/justification distinction. HANS WELZEL, DERECHO PENAL ALEMAN 97-98 (Juan Bus-
tos Ramirez & Sergio Yifiez P6rez trans., Editorial Juridica de Chile 4th ed. 1997).
125 This, of course, assumes that the person did not die as a result of the conduct. If
he had died, then the act would satisfy the elements of the offense of homicide.
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the elements of the offense of assault and injures one of the most
important interests protected by criminal law. Since this con-
duct is harmful, the law provides us with sound reasons not to
engage in the act (protecting life or physical integrity), even if
doing so would be justified.
b. Reasons and the Offense/Justification Distinction
Another way of making sense of the offense/justification
distinction is by examining the different manner in which these
categories seek to mold human conduct. By criminalizing of-
fenses, society aims to provide people with reasons against en-
gaging in the prohibited course of action.126 Take, for example,
the offense of arson. When the act of setting property of another
on fire without his consent is prohibited, the citizenry has a
sound reason against engaging in this type of conduct. Thus, if
Randy were to ask Ralph whether he should burn down Sasha's
cornfield, Ralph could coherently point to the fact that doing so
would satisfy the elements of a criminal offense as a sound rea-
son for Randy not to engage in the conduct.
Contrarily, the law provides no reason against engaging in
conduct that does not constitute of an offense. Thus, the law
provides no reason that can be advanced against Sasha's deci-
sion to burn down his own cornfield in order to build a barn, for
this conduct does not satisfy the elements of an offense.127 Al-
though people might have a myriad of grounds for opposing Sa-
sha's decision to burn down his cornfield, they cannot claim that
such grounds make Sasha's decision to perform the conduct ille-
gal.
Justifications, on the other hand, do not provide us with
reasons to abstain from performing a given act. When we recog-
126 Gardner, supra note 14, at 822 (stating that prohibitory norms provide us with
reasons "not to perform the prohibited act" and, by way of example, that the "norm that
prohibits promise-breaking ... is [among other things] a reason not to break promises").
127 The conduct satisfies neither the elements of the offense of arson nor criminal
mischief, for both of these offenses require that the property that is destroyed (criminal
mischief) or set on fire (arson) belong to another.
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nize the existence of a justification, we aim to provide people
with sound reasons in favor of engaging in conduct that satisfies
the elements of an offense. Hence, justifications provide us with
"legally admissible reason[s] in favour of [acting in] nonconform-
ity with the norm."12
Suppose, for example, that Randy now asked Ralph
whether he could burn down Sasha's cornfield in order to create
a firebreak that will prevent three homes from being engulfed by
flames. This time, Ralph could respond by stating that the exis-
tence of justificatory circumstances (necessity/choice of evils)
provide Randy with sound reasons to burn down the cornfield,
even if engaging in such conduct infringes the elements of the
offense of arson.
It should be noted, however, that the fact that justifications
provide us with good reasons for engaging in the conduct does
not mean that the reasons that the offense provides against per-
forming the conduct magically disappear.'2 9 Thus, it has been
stated that:
When someone pleads a justification, she is claiming that the
reasons in favour of doing as she did stand undefeated by the
reasons against. The reasons against are those that make
what she did an offence. They have not gone away. They still
make it an offence. But the reasons in favour prevail and make
it a justified offence (and hence one of which she should be ac-
quitted). 130
Since the reasons that the offense provides for abstaining to
engage in the act are not swept away by the existence of justifi-
catory circumstances, some residual reasons for not performing
the conduct remain even if the act is ultimately justified. Conse-
quently, although necessity provides Randy with good reasons
for burning down Sasha's cornfield, the fact that doing so in-
128 Gardner, supra note 14, at 822.
129 Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS
FROM THE W.G. HART WORKSHOP, 1986 73, 83 (I.H. Dennis ed. 1987).
130 Gardner, supra note 14, at 819 (emphasis added).
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fringes the elements of the offense of arson still provides us with
some residual reasons against performing the justified conduct.
However, given that these residual reasons (saving the corn-
field) are not of sufficient force to outweigh the reasons in favor
of engaging in the conduct that the existence of justificatory cir-
cumstances provide (saving three homes), burning down Sasha's
cornfield in such a case cannot be considered criminal.
C. Regrettable vs. Non-Regrettable Lawful Acts
While residual reasons against performing an act that con-
stitutes an offense do not afford us with sufficient grounds to
criminalize the conduct if it is justified, they do provide us with
sound reasons to feel regret for having engaged in the conduct.
We have cause to regret the conduct because, all things being
considered, "[i]t would have been better ... had there been no
occasion to commit [the act], . . . whether its commission was
justified or not."' 1 Therefore, justified conduct, although lawful,
is regrettable, for the harm that the infraction represents is not
wiped away merely by the existence of justificatory circum-
stances.
In a recent article, Professors Michelle Dempsey and Jona-
than Herring convincingly argued that "[j]ustified prima facie
wrongdoing leaves a moral residue of regret" and that regret
produced has significant "rational force." '32 This regret has ra-
tional force because it generates reasons "to prefer less wrongful
alternatives to securing the values that justify the prima facie
wrongful conduct."'33
Suppose, for example, that the law does not impose a duty
to retreat as a prerequisite to the use of justifiable force in self-
defense. In such a jurisdiction, Sandra could justifiably kill
Laura in order to repel her unlawful deadly attack, even if she
131 Id. at 820.
132 Michelle Madden Dempsey & Jonathan Herring, Why Sexual Penetration Requires




could have avoided injury by retreating to a safe place. How-
ever, since the act of killing Laura satisfies the elements of the
offense of homicide, Sandra has a good reason (saving Laura's
life) to abstain from the justifiable conduct. Although the rea-
sons against engaging in the conduct that the offense represents
are not of sufficient weight to make Sandra's justifiable use of
deadly force criminal, these reasons do provide her with motives
to regret killing Laura. Furthermore, these residual "regret-
causing motives" afford Sandra with reasons to attempt to avert
the unlawful attack by retreating, although it would not be
criminal for her to repel the attack by killing Laura in self-
defense. Curiously, the reason that the offense provides against
killing Laura in self-defense in the first place-the protection of
human life-is the same reason that counsels in favor of at-
tempting to avert the attack by less harmful alternatives.1 34
Conversely acts that do not satisfy the elements of an of-
fense do not generate reasons to regret the conduct. As a result,
a person who engages in conduct that does not constitute an of-
fense has no reason for seeking less injurious alternatives in or-
der to achieve whatever it is that he or she aims to accomplish
by performing the act. For instance, the law does not afford
someone who shoots at a piece of paper reasons to feel regret for
having engaged in the conduct. Accordingly, there is no reason
for a person to attempt to make use of other, less harmful means
in order to achieve whatever he or she aims to accomplish by
shooting at the piece of paper (target practice, for example).
134 Dempsey and Herring illustrate the rational force of regret by way of the following
example:
Surgical cutting into a patient's body is a prima facie wrong, but one that may
be justified in virtue of reasons generated inter alia by the value of the pa-
tient's life and well-being. Despite its justification, however, cutting into a pa-
tient's body is still to be regretted. This regret generates reasons for medical
personnel to seek less wrongful alternatives to securing the values sought by
the surgery. If, for example, the purpose of the cutting is to perform explora-
tory surgery in hopes of diagnosing a source of the patient's abdominal pain, it
is rationally incumbent upon the surgeon to seek less wrongful alternatives to




3. The Supra-Statutory Nature of the Offense/Justification
Distinction
On some occasions, the positive law clearly distinguishes
between offenses and justifications. This is typically the case
with regard to conduct that is regulated in the comprehensive
penal codes of most jurisdictions. Usually, criminal codes are
divided into a "special part" and a "general part." The special
part contains offenses, the commission of which is regarded as
prima facie wrongful. The general part, on the other hand, con-
tains a series of general doctrines of criminal responsibility that,
in principle, apply to every commission of an offense.135 Here,
one can typically find provisions that deal with the exculpatory
dimension of criminal offenses and, consequently, with justifica-
tion defenses.
Since the special part of penal codes contains a long list of
offenses and the general part usually contains a catalogue of
justification defenses (self-defense, necessity, law enforcement
duties, etc.), the offense/justification distinction is often clearly
reflected in the statutory law of any given jurisdiction. The New
York Penal Law, for example, distinguishes between "general
provisions" (i.e. the "general part") and "specific offenses" (i.e.
the "special part").136 Thus, the list of acts that are deemed to be
prima facie illegal are regulated in the "specific offenses" part of
the Penal Law, whereas the justificatory circumstances that
permit what would otherwise constitute an unlawful act are
provided in the "general provisions" section of the code.
1 37
Such an organizational structure of penal laws typically
135 Thus, the general part of many criminal codes contains provisions with regard to
basic doctrines of criminal law, such as the "act requirement," the forms of culpability
(i.e. intent and negligence), attempt liability, perpetration and complicity, etc. See gener-
ally FLETCHER, supra note 63, at 393-95.
136 N.Y. PENAL LAW pts. I, III (McKinney 2004). New York Penal Law contains an
additional part that is intended to regulate sentencing practices. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
pt. II (McKinney 2004).
137 § 35 (defenses of justification listed in "general provisions"); §§ 120-275.45 (illegal
acts listed in "specific crimes" section of code)
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makes it easier to differentiate between offenses and justifica-
tions. As an example, an examination of New York law reveals
that whoever kills a human being in self-defense has committed
the offense of homicide. 3 ' Given that this conduct constitutes
an offense, there are sound reasons against engaging in the act.
In spite of this, the use of force in self-defense is not criminal
pursuant to New York law because it is justified. 39 Thus, al-
though the fact that such conduct satisfies the elements of an of-
fense provides reasons to abstain from engaging in the act, the
existence of justificatory circumstances makes this conduct, on
balance, not wrongful.
Unfortunately, legislative appearances can sometimes be
deceiving, for criminal statutes do not always clearly differenti-
ate between conduct that is legal because it does not satisfy the
elements of an offense and conduct that is legal because it is jus-
tified. The California Penal Code provision defining murder is a
chief example. According to the code, "[m]urder is the unlawful
killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought."14 What
makes this provision problematic is that it infelicitously con-
flates the inculpatory and exculpatory dimensions of the crime
by specifying that murder is an "unlawful killing."14' Since jus-
tified killings are, by definition, lawful, it follows that deaths
that are produced as a result of the justifiable use of force do not
satisfy California's definition of murder. At first glance, one
might be tempted to conclude that, in California, causing the
death of a person in self-defense is lawful because it does not sat-
isfy the elements of murder. Therefore, it might be argued that a
person who kills another in self-defense has committed no prima




140 CAL. PENAL CODE §187(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
141 Id.
142 According to this reading, justifications (i.e. self-defense) would constitute negative
elements of the offense, rather than independent defenses that negate the wrongfulness
of the conduct without negating the elements of the offense. Some European scholars
maintain this is the best way to interpret criminal statutes. See, e.g., DIEGO MANUEL
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Although seductive, this understanding of the of-
fense/justification distinction is either wrong or profoundly unil-
luminating. If the distinction is to be of any consequence, of-
fenses and justifications ought to be understood as conceptual
categories that help us to better appreciate the general structure
of punishable crimes, not as labels that can be legislatively de-
fined in such a way that distinguishing between these categories
would be a worthless endeavor. The reason so much attention
has been paid to the offense/justification dichotomy in this arti-
cle is because we can learn something about the law, morality
and society by understanding the distinction. Thus, by using
the terms "offense" and "justification," I am making broad
claims about the nature and structure of punishable crimes in
our society, not about the particular way in which legislatures
such as California have sloppily drafted their murder statutes
(or any other criminal statutes).
Therefore, the offense/justification distinction is supra-
statutory in nature. According to this understanding of the dis-
tinction, which is widely shared by criminal theorists and legal
philosophers, the way in which a statute has been drafted is not
determinative when ascertaining whether conduct should be
considered lawful because it does not constitute an offense or be-
cause it is justified.
1 43
Since the statutory formulations of crimes can sometimes
be misleading, it is necessary to elaborate supra-statutory stan-
dards that allow us to distinguish between conduct that is law-
ful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense and
LUZ6N PENA, CURSO DE DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL I 302-03 (Universitas 1996).
This position, however, has been convincingly criticized by numerous scholars. See gen-
erally FRANCISCO MuIoz CONDE & MERCEDES GARCiA ARAN, DERECHO PENAL PARTE
GENERAL 252-53 (Tirant Lo Blanch 2004).
"I This view was forcefully defended by the leading German criminal theorist Hans
Welzel, who stated that whether the legislature decides to incorporate the criteria of jus-
tification into the definition of a crime is "irrelevant" to distinguishing between the of-
fense and the justification. WELZEL, supra note 124, at 96 (asserting that "even if self-
defense were to be included [as part of the definition of the crime of homicide] . . . the
non-existence of the defense would not be transformed into a 'negative' element of the
offense" (translation by author)). Id.
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conduct that is lawful because it is justified. In my opinion, this
can be accomplished by appealing to the ideas that undergird
the different ways of understanding the offense/justification dis-
tinction that have been elaborated in this section.
Previously, the communicative significance of the "offense"
and "justification" categories was demonstrated by appealing to
three different notions-harmful versus non-harmful lawful
acts, reasons against and in favor of performing an act, and re-
grettable versus non-regrettable lawful conduct.1 4 4  These no-
tions can serve as heuristic devices that aid us in the sometimes
difficult endeavor of distinguishing between offenses and justifi-
cations, particularly when the statutory law does not provide
much guidance.
Thus, regardless of how legislatures decide to draft their
criminal statutes, a useful way of distinguishing between differ-
ent types of non-wrongful acts is by asking ourselves the follow-
ing questions:
(1) Is the conduct lawful because: (a) no harm has been caused,
or (b) although harm has been caused, the benefits that result
from the conduct outweigh the harm produced by the conduct?
(2) Is the conduct lawful because: (a) there are no reasons to re-
frain from performing it, or (b) although there are reasons
against engaging in the conduct, they are outweighed by rea-
sons in favor of performing the conduct?
(3) Do we have reasons to attempt to make use of other, less
harmful means in order to achieve what we aimed to accom-
plish by engaging in the lawful act?-(a) no, because there are
no reasons to regret having engaged in the act, or (b) yes, be-
cause there are reasons to regret having engaged in the act?
If the answer to the three questions is (a), then the conduct
is lawful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense.
On the other hand, if the answer to these questions is (b), the
144 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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conduct is lawful because it is justified.
These questions provide guidance when determining
whether a killing in self-defense is not wrongful because it does
not satisfy the elements of an offense or because it is justified.
As was previously stated, the California murder provision sug-
gests that such killings are lawful because they do not satisfy
the elements of an offense.14 5 This conclusion, however, is mis-
guided, given that:
(1) The conduct is lawful because, although harm has been
caused (death of the aggressor), the evil wreaked by the con-
duct is outweighed by the evil avoided by the conduct (death of
person unlawfully attacked).
(2) The conduct is lawful because, although there are reasons
against engaging in the conduct (protecting the life of the ag-
gressor), they are outweighed by reasons in favor of performing
the conduct (protecting the life of the person attacked).
(3) We have reasons to attempt to use other, less harmful
means in order to achieve what we aimed to accomplish by kill-
ing the aggressor in self-defense (by retreating, for example)
because there are reasons to regret having killed the aggressor.
C. The Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses
1. The Ambiguity of Animal Cruelty Laws
Now that we have explored the general structure of punish-
able crimes, we are in a better position to understand the par-
ticular structure of anti-cruelty statutes. Anti-cruelty laws, like
other criminal statutes, have an inculpatory and exculpatory
dimension. Thus, a reading of these laws reveals that they pur-
port to both describe conduct that society considers to be prima
facie wrongful and to illustrate circumstances in which engaging
145 See supra note 140-42 and accompanying text.
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in such conduct is, all things being considered, non-wrongful. In
other words, anti-cruelty statutes contain both definitions of of-
fenses and a catalogue of justifications. The problem, however,
as anyone who has read up to this point would probably suspect,
is that these laws do not clearly differentiate between conduct
that is not wrongful because it does not satisfy the elements of
an offense and acts that are lawful because they are justified.
Take, for example, the Montana anti-cruelty statute which
criminalizes a variety of acts, such as "injuring" or "killing" an
animal. 1 46 However, it also states that "[t]his section does not
prohibit [injuring or killing an animal as result of] ... commonly
accepted agricultural ... practices." '147 The combined effect of
these two provisions is unclear. There are a couple of plausible
interpretations of this statute:
(1) Injuring or killing an animal as a result of lawful agricul-
tural practices is not prohibited (i.e., is "lawful") because doing
so does not satisfy the elements of an offense; or
(2) Injuring or killing an animal as a result of lawful agricul-
tural practices is not prohibited because, although doing so sat-
isfies the elements of an offense, it is justified.
Similar ambiguity plagues the Texas anti-cruelty statute
which holds intentionally or knowingly torturing livestock a
crime. 148 However, "[i]t is a defense to prosecution... that the
actor [harmed the animal as a result of being] engaged in bona
fide... scientific research." '4 9 Once again, there are two possible
interpretations of this statute:
(1) Torturing an animal for bona fide scientific experimentation
is not prohibited because doing so does not satisfy the ele-
ments of an offense, or
146 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-211(1)(a) (2007).
147 § 45-8-211(4)(b).




(2) Torturing an animal for bona fide scientific experimentation
is not prohibited because doing so is justified.
How should we determine which of the plausible readings of
the Texas and Montana statutes 5 0 represents the best interpre-
tation of animal cruelty laws?1 51
One possible way to tackle this matter would be to look for
answers by parsing the statutory text. Some might believe, for
example, that the fact that the Texas statute states that "it is a
defense" to prosecution when the harm was caused as a result of
scientific experimentation implies that this conduct is justified,
for justifications are defenses to crimes. Furthermore, it might
be argued that since the Montana statute asserts that it does
not prohibit injuring animals as a result of common agricultural
practices, engaging in such conduct does not even satisfy the
elements of the offense.
This type of analysis strikes me as formalistic and un-
enlightening. It is clear these statutes purport to exclude cer-
tain activities that are harmful to animals (scientific experi-
ments and agricultural practices) from the reach of the criminal
law. 52 However, that much should not be read into the specific
way in which legislatures have drafted such exceptions.
Whether a statute declares the lawfulness of such conduct by
asserting that it is a defense to the crime or by claiming that the
act is not prohibited by the law is immaterial to the question
about whether the legality of the conduct stems from the fact
150 Since the Montana and Texas anti-cruelty statutes are representative of most
animal cruelty laws in the United States, additional examples of the problems of inter-
pretation that these statutes entail are not needed.
1651 Some might argue the answer to this question is of little significance, for, in any
case, the aforementioned conduct is lawful regardless of whether it does not constitute
an offense or is justified. This argument fails to grasp the communicative significance of
the offense/justification distinction. It surely is not trivial whether society considers that
injuring an animal as a result of scientific or agricultural practices has more in common
with the act of shooting at a piece of paper (conduct that does not constitute an offense)
than with the act of shooting a person in self.defense (justifiable conduct). Therefore, it
seems to me that attempting to find an answer to this question is warranted.
162 See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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that it does not constitute an offense or from its justifiable na-
ture.
Since the offense/justification distinction is supra-statutory
in nature, a more satisfying answer to this question can be ob-
tained by appealing to the heuristic devices described in the
previous subsection.
2. Harm, Reasons and Regret in Anti-Cruelty Statutes
a. Harmful Legal Acts and Anti-Cruelty Statutes
As this article has discussed, there is clearly a difference
between non-harmful and harmful legal acts. Conduct that does
not satisfy the elements of an offense does not typically cause
harm (e.g., shooting at a piece of paper). However, justified con-
duct usually causes harm, although the harm avoided by engag-
ing in the act is greater than the one inflicted (e.g., shooting at a
person in self-defense). Thus, the first question when examining
the nature of the exemption from punishment for persons who
injure animals (e.g., pursuant to scientific or agricultural prac-
tices) is whether those acts are lawful because they do not cause
harm or because the harm inflicted is outweighed by the bene-
fits reaped from engaging in the conduct. The following exam-
ples might help us to answer this question.
(1) Judy dislocates a rabbit's neck because she enjoys seeing
animals suffer.
(2) Judy dislocates a rabbit's neck pursuant to a bona fide sci-
entific experiment.
(3) Judy dislocates a rabbit's neck in order to slaughter the
creature and sell it in a commercial establishment pursuant to
local laws.
The conduct in example (1) is clearly criminal under most,
if not all, modern anti-cruelty statutes. Thus, the harm that is
caused to the rabbit is most certainly relevant in the criminal
law. The conduct in example (2), on the other hand, is almost
2008]
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undoubtedly lawful under traditional animal cruelty statutes. It
would be misguided, however, to believe the legality of such con-
duct stems from the fact that the harm caused to the rabbit is
legally irrelevant. As example (1) demonstrates, the infliction of
harm to rabbits matters in the criminal law. It would thus be
odd to assume that if the rabbit was injured pursuant to a bona
fide scientific activity that magically erases the harm caused to
the creature.
Consequently, it makes better sense to conclude that the
exemption from punishment afforded in example (2) is the prod-
uct of a determination that the conduct is lawful because the
harm endured by the animal is outweighed by the potential
benefits of engaging in the scientific experimentation. Of
course, one might disagree with the relative value that the law
assigns to the interests in conflict in such cases. Many, includ-
ing myself, believe the harm caused to the rabbit should be
given much more weight than is currently the case. 153 However,
this disagreement does not prove that the injury caused to the
rabbit in such cases does not "count" as harm under the criminal
law. It merely demonstrates that such harm does not "count" as
much as I, and most animal law scholars, believe that it should.
The conduct in example (3) should be treated in much the
same way as the conduct in example (2). There is nothing magi-
cal about food production that makes the harm caused to the
rabbit in example (3) any different from the harm caused to the
animal in example (1). The harm caused in both cases is identi-
cal: the dislocation of a rabbit's neck. The infliction of this
harm, qua harm, remains unwelcome. However, the conduct in
example (3) is lawful because the benefits generated by the con-
duct (production of food) are deemed to outweigh the harm
caused to the animal.
An examination of these hypotheticals reveals that the rea-
son why injuring an animal pursuant to agricultural or scientific
activities is lawful is not because doing so does not constitute an
153 See generally Bryant supra note 118.
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offense, for such acts harm an interest protected by the criminal
law. These acts are legal because they are justified, for, even
though the harm they cause matters in the criminal law, it is
(rightly or wrongly) outweighed by countervailing considera-
tions.
b. "Reasons" and Anti-Cruelty Statutes
Another way of probing the structure of animal cruelty
statutes is by examining whether persons who harm animals
pursuant to certain enumerated activities act lawfully because
there are no reasons for prohibiting such conduct or because, de-
spite there being reasons against performing such conduct, they
are outweighed by the reasons in favor of engaging in the con-
duct. If the former explanation for the lawfulness of the conduct
is accurate (i.e., there are no reasons against performing the
act), then it should be concluded that harm to animals as a re-
sult of scientific or agricultural activities does not constitute an
offense. However, if the latter explanation for the lawfulness of
the conduct is correct (i.e., the reasons in favor of performing the
act outweigh the reasons against), then engaging in such acts is
lawful because it is justified. An examination of the examples
put forth in the previous subsection is once again useful to a dis-
cussion of these matters.
Example (1) demonstrates that animal cruelty statutes pro-
vide reasons against injuring animals.1 54 If Judy were to ask
Andy whether she should dislocate a rabbit's neck, Andy would
be able to point out that anti-cruelty statutes give her good rea-
sons to abstain from doing so. In other words, such statutes
provide us with prima facie reasons against injuring an animal.
On the other hand, examples (2) and (3) show that animal cru-
elty statutes also provide us with reasons in favor of harming
animals (scientific experiments and food production) that might
outweigh the prima facie reasons that the law provides against
154 See examples supra Part IV.C.2.a.
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engaging in such conduct (keeping animals free from harm).1"
It should be noted, however, that it invites confusion to
state that the presence of reasons in favor of performing the
conduct wipes away the reasons against engaging in it. It would
be misleading to assert that the law provides no reasons against
dislocating a rabbit's neck if such harm takes place as a result of
scientific experimentation or food processing practices. It makes
better sense to conclude that, despite the fact that we have good
reasons not to dislocate a rabbit's neck, those reasons are out-
weighed if the injuries occur pursuant to certain lawful activi-
ties.
These reflections corroborate that engaging in conduct that
falls within an exception to an anti-cruelty statute is lawful be-
cause it is justified, not because it does not constitute an offense.
Consequently, although the law affords Judy with valid grounds
to injure an animal pursuant to scientific or food processing ac-
tivities, the fact that doing so constitutes an offense still pro-
vides her with residual reasons against performing the justified
conduct. However, given that these residual reasons (e.g., keep-
ing the animal free from harm) are not of sufficient weight to
counterbalance the reasons in favor of engaging in the act,
which the presence of justificatory circumstances provides (e.g.,
scientific advancement, food processing), dislocating the rabbit's
neck is considered legal in such circumstances.
C. Regret and Anti-Cruelty Statutes
The residual reasons that remain against harming an ani-
mal even in circumstances when doing so would be justified pur-
suant to some lawful activity provide sufficient motives to regret
causing the harm, even if doing so was justifiable. The rational
force of such regret should lead persons to seek other, less harm-
ful alternatives to achieving the ends that they aimed to accom-
plish by injuring animals.




edge she wishes to attain by injuring the rabbit by engaging in
scientific experiments that do not involve harm to animals. I
think that this belief is shared by most people. Even if the ma-
jority of the population believes that it is justifiable to harm
animals in order to advance science, many people are disturbed
by the suffering that such activities cause to animals. It is fair
to say, the bulk of the populace regrets the harm inflicted on
these animals and would thus prefer that, if possible, other less
injurious alternatives be used in order to achieve scientific ad-
vancement. Similarly, we have reason to regret harm to ani-
mals pursuant to food processing activities. As a result, most
people would probably prefer that those in charge of engaging in
such activities seek the least harmful methods to achieve the de-
sired end.
The fact that we have good reason to regret harming ani-
mals pursuant to scientific and agricultural activities buttresses
the conclusion that engaging in such conduct is lawful because it
is justified, not because it does not satisfy the elements of an of-
fense. As stated before, conduct that is lawful because it does
not satisfy the elements of an offense (e.g., shooting at a piece of
paper) is typically not regrettable. However, conduct that is
lawful because it is justified (e.g., shooting a person in self-
defense) is generally regrettable. Thus, it makes more sense to
conclude that injuring an animal in order to advance scientific
knowledge or to produce food has more in common with the act
of shooting at a person in self-defense than with the act of shoot-
ing at a piece of paper.
As has been discussed, both the acts of harming an animal
pursuant to an exempted activity and of shooting a person in
self-defense inflict harm that is relevant for the criminal law.
Furthermore, these acts are lawful because the reasons in favor
of performing them outweigh the reasons against performing
them, not because there are no reasons to abstain from perform-
ing the acts in the first place. As a result, there are reasons to
regret both harming animals and shooting human beings, even
if doing so would be justifiable. This, in turn, generates reasons
to choose less injurious alternatives in order to attain the end
sought by persons engaging in the justified conduct.
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The following table summarizes the conclusions that have
been advanced up to this point:






















A person who commits the offense
has:
" harmed an interest that the
criminal law seeks to protect;
* performed conduct that is, all
things being equal, wrongful;
* engaged in conduct that he or
she has reasons to refrain
from performing;
* performed conduct that we
have reason to regret.
A person who justifiably commits the
offense has:
* harmed an interest that the
criminal law seeks to protect,
but the harmed caused is
outweighed by the benefits
generated by the conduct;
* performed conduct that is, all
things being considered, not
wrongful;
* reasons for engaging in the
conduct that outweigh the
reasons against performing
the conduct;
* performed lawful conduct
that he or she nevertheless
has reasons to regret.
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D. Why the Animal Law Scholars' Claims Are Wrong
An understanding of the conceptual structure of anti-
cruelty offenses reveals that the interpretation of such laws
typically espoused by animal law scholars is misguided. Once
one differentiates between the inculpatory (the offense) and ex-
culpatory (the justifications) dimensions of these laws, one can
see why it is not true that, as Professor Bryant has argued, the
harm caused to animals as a result of the activities that are ex-
empted from punishment under the typical anti-cruelty statute
"simply does not count in legal terms."156
As has been argued, acts that are considered lawful pursu-
ant to one of these exemptions remain harmful even though they
are justified. It is thus unfounded to conclude that the harm in-
flicted on animals pursuant to justifiable activities does not
"count" as legally relevant harm. The presence of justificatory
circumstances (such as the advancement of agricultural or scien-
tific activities) does not wipe away the harm caused by the con-
duct. What these exemptions actually reveal is that there are
countervailing reasons that society considers to be of sufficient
weight to justify engaging in prima facie wrongful conduct that
causes harm to animals, not that the offense was not designed to
protect animals in the first place. Therefore, the thesis ad-
vanced in this article-that the chief reason why society creates
anti-cruelty offenses is to protect animals from the infliction of
harm-is not incompatible with the exemptions contemplated in
the typical animal cruelty statute.
E. Why All of This Should Matter to an Animal Rights Activist
Up to this point, this article has demonstrated that many
animal law scholars' interpretations of the exemptions in anti-
cruelty statutes are misguided because their interpretations con-
flate the inculpatory and exculpatory dimensions of such laws.
156 Bryant, supra note 118.
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Now, this section will briefly sketch why such an interpretation
is also objectionable on pragmatic grounds.
The reading of anti-cruelty statutes criticized here is proba-
bly the product of the fundamental disagreement that many
animal law scholars have with the myriad of reasons that such
laws provide as justifications for committing the offense. For
them, the fact that the exemptions throughout these statutes
leave an inordinate number of acts that are harmful to animals
unpunished demonstrates that the real purpose of these laws is
to protect human activities that cannot be accomplished without
injuring animals.
157
Although I am also outraged by many of the justifications
these statutes provide for inflicting harm to animals, I believe
that those who defend the position that I have attempted to de-
bunk here have failed to understand what seems intuitively ob-
vious to most people-that society has called for the creation of
anti-cruelty offenses as a way of protecting animals, not as a ve-
hicle for perpetuating the exploitation of them. ' In my opinion,
it is a strategic blunder to ignore that, as Jerrold Tannenbaum
has correctly pointed out, people "virtually universally" accept
the proposition that "the primary purpose of [anti-cruelty] laws
is to protect animals." '159 Thus, instead of decrying statutes that
criminalize animal abuse as another example of how animals
are treated as "fungible" and "disposable" goods, 160 we should
argue against the existence of the many exemptions that plague
such laws by tapping into the basic sentiment that has led peo-
ple to call for the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes in the first
place.
157 See id.
158 Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161,
171-72 (2006).
159 Jerrold Tannenbaum, Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 62 Soc.
RES. 539, 580 (1995).




A. Statutes Criminalizing Harmful Conduct Against Animals Do
Not Primarily Seek to Protect Property Interests
The conclusion that anti-cruelty statutes do not primarily
seek to further property interests will strike some as provoca-
tive. Many, if not most, animal law scholars have accepted Pro-
fessor Francione's contention that "as far as the law is con-
cerned,... animals are nothing more than commodities."' 1
Thus, the proposition that animals are, for all relevant legal
purposes, treated as property is generally accepted.
While this might very well be the case in the non-criminal
context, it does not ring true as far as the penal law is con-
cerned. Although a property-based conception of anti-cruelty
statutes prevailed during much of the nineteenth century, since
then, there has been a steady trend toward criminalizing animal
abuse, regardless of questions of property. Under modern ani-
mal cruelty statutes, pet owners are generally not free to harm
their animals. Furthermore, pet owners typically cannot con-
sent to letting their animals be harmed by someone else. These
propositions are at odds with a property-based conception of
such laws.
Some believe the only way to give animals the protection
they deserve lies in changing their legal status from property to
persons. In an attempt to convince people that this shift in the
juridical status of animals is necessary, scholars have tradition-
ally appealed to extra-legal philosophical arguments. While
these theoretical avenues are certainly worth pursuing, the
seeds of the "personhood" of animals can already be found in
modern animal cruelty laws. As far as anti-cruelty statutes are
concerned, animals are being treated like persons in a very im-
portant way-they qualify as victims worthy of being protected
by the criminal laws irrespective of their property status in the




B. Harm to Animals is Not Criminalized Primarily
as a Means of Enforcing Morality
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing
discussion is that, although mistreating animals is certainly
immoral, it should not be contended that this is the principal
reason for criminalizing the conduct. If there is one thing that
the venerable harm principle stands for, it is the fact that an act
should not be proscribed solely because it is deemed to be con-
trary to a moral principle. This contention is both compatible
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence16 2 and with the
position held by most criminal law theorists.
C. Criminal Statutes that Prohibit Harm to Animals Primarily
Seek to Protect Animals from Being Harmed
The view that animal cruelty statutes seek to prevent harm
to animals is both normatively appealing and descriptively illu-
minating. From a normative viewpoint, conferring legal protec-
tion to non-human sentient beings is a welcome development. If
we can all agree that experiencing pain is something worth
avoiding and that non-human animals have the capacity to be
cognizant of such feelings, it follows that we should also protect
them from the unjustifiable infliction of suffering.
From a descriptive standpoint it is also preferable to con-
ceive anti-cruelty statutes as laws that are designed to prevent
harm to animals. Both domestically and internationally, gov-
ernments are banning activities that cause harm to animals de-
spite the fact that these activities sometimes command consid-
erable support from the populace. Thus, all state jurisdictions
in the United States have criminalized dog and cock fighting
over the objections of many.16 3 Similarly, bullfighting is banned
162 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
163 Ed Anderson, Louisiana's ban on cockfighting takes effect Friday;
But adherents say practice won't die, Times Picayune, Aug. 13, 2008, at Nat'l 1.
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in several countries once associated with the Spanish crown, de-
spite its rich historical roots.164 These recent trends in anti-
cruelty legislation are difficult to explain unless one believes the
chief purpose of criminalizing animal abuse is to prevent the un-
justifiable suffering of animals. No alternative conception of
animal cruelty laws comes close to explaining this trend in anti-
cruelty legislation.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that anti-cruelty
statutes were enacted solely for the purpose of protecting' ani-
mals from harm. Undoubtedly, these laws, like many other
criminal statutes (i.e. rape and murder statutes), also exist in
partial recognition of the fact that most people consider that en-
gaging in the prohibited conduct is morally reprehensible. Fur-
thermore, it is likely that the decision to criminalize cruelty to
animals was motivated to some extent by an interest in prevent-
ing emotional pain to those with close ties to the creatures
harmed or curbing future harm to humans. 6 ' It might also be
argued that some features of animal cruelty laws promote the
preservation of certain property interests.
Nevertheless, I believe that the conclusion that the primary
purpose of animal cruelty statutes is to protect animals from
harm is inescapable. This conclusion is not contradicted by the
fact that these laws contain exemptions that allow for the causa-
tion of harm to animals pursuant to certain lawful activities
(scientific experimentation, agriculture, hunting, etc.). An ex-
amination of the structure of anti-cruelty statutes reveals the
exempted activities promote interests that justify inflicting suf-
fering on animals, not that laws criminalizing animal abuse
were not designed to protect the creatures in the first place.
164 In Latin America, bullfighting has been banned in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and
Cuba. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Legislation Prohibiting or Restrict-
ing Animal Acts (2005), http://www.wildlifepimps.com/AnimalActsLeg.pdf (last visited
Oct. 31, 2008).
165 See supra Parts III.B-C.
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Once it is understood that the principal purpose of anti-
cruelty statutes is to prevent injury to animals, one can see why
the decision in People v. Garcia1 66 cannot withstand close scru-
tiny. The court in Garcia asked all of the wrong questions be-
cause it seemed to conceive animal cruelty statutes as laws that
are designed either to prevent future harm to humans or to pre-
vent emotional harm to those with close ties to the animal
abused. The former conceptualization of animal cruelty statutes
led the court to focus on the state of mind of the perpetrator in
order to determine whether his act evinced a heightened level of
cruelty.1 7 The latter characterization led the court to focus on
the emotional harm caused to the custodian of the pet.18
By misapprehending the nature and purpose of anti-cruelty
statutes, the court gave short shrift to the only being whose in-
terests were sought to be protected by such legislation-the
animal harmed-in this case, Junior the goldfish. Therefore, the
question that should have been asked in Garcia is whether the
instantaneous killing of a goldfish by stomping on it constitutes
an act of simple or aggravated cruelty. The decisive considera-
tion should thus be the amount of pain and suffering endured by
the fish. As the amount of pain inflicted increases, the argu-
ments in favor of considering the act to be one of aggravated
cruelty get stronger. Conversely, as the amount of pain and suf-
fering decreases, the case in favor of finding aggravated cruelty
weakens.
Reasonable minds might disagree with regard to whether
the suffering endured by Junior was of such a degree to warrant
a determination of aggravated cruelty. On one hand, the defen-
dant's contention that the fish did not suffer because it was
killed instantly seems to point in the direction of not considering
this act to be one of aggravated cruelty. On the other hand, it
166 See supra note 26.
167 People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
1u Id.
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might be argued the killing of a being constitutes the supreme
act of cruelty. If this view prevailed, a finding of aggravated
cruelty would be warranted.
Regardless of whether one believes the defendant should
have prevailed in his arguments, there is little doubt with re-
gard to who was the real victim of the court's analysis in Garcia
-a little goldfish named Junior.

